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What is the significance of the 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali? The formal outcomes, especially
the ‘Bali Action Plan’, are described and commented on, along with the challenges for negotiating a post-2012
agreement in Copenhagen during 2008 and 2009. The article concludes that the outcome of the Bali meeting is
insufficient when compared to the nature of the challenge posed by climate change. However, it can nevertheless be
considered a success in terms of ‘Realpolitik’ in paving the way for the negotiations ahead, because some real changes
have been discerned in the political landscape. The challenges for the road towards Copenhagen are manifold: the
sheer volume and complexity of the issues and the far-reaching nature of decisions such as differentiation between non-
Annex I countries pose significant challenges in themselves, while the dependency on the electoral process in the USA
introduces a high element of risk into the whole process. The emergence of social justice as an issue turns climate policy
into an endeavour to improve the world at large – thereby adding to the complexity. And, finally, the biggest challenge
is the recognition that the climate problem requires a global solution, that Annex I and non-Annex I countries are mutually
dependent on each other and that only cooperation regarding technology in combination with significant financial
support will provide the chance to successfully tackle climate change.
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South–North
Quelle est la portée de la conférence des Nations Unis de 2007 sur le changement climatique qui s’est tenue a Bali? Les
décisions officielles, en particulier le « plan d’action de Bali » sont décrites et analysées, ainsi que les difficultés pour les
négociations sur un accord post-2012 qui se dérouleront à Copenhague en 2009. L’article conclut que le compromis final
obtenu à Bali est insuffisant par rapport à la nature du défi climatique. Cependant, il peut être considéré comme un
succès en terme de « realpolitik » car de véritables changements peuvent être discernés dans le paysage politique. Les
obstacles sur la route vers Copenhague sont multiples: le volume même et la complexité des enjeux; la portée de
certaines décisions notamment la différenciation entre les pays non inscrits à l’annexe 1 pose en elle-même des défis
importants; enfin la dépendance du processus électoral aux Etats-Unis introduit un élément important de risque dans le
processus général. L’émergence de la justice sociale en tant qu’enjeu fait de la politique climatique une entreprise à
dessein d’améliorer le monde – la rendant de ce fait plus complexe. Finalement, le plus grand défi est dans la
reconnaissance du fait que l’enjeu climatique nécessite des solutions à l’échelle planétaire, que les pays de l’annexe 1 et
les pays non inscrits à cette annexe sont dépendants entre eux et que seule une coo pération technologique associée à un
apport financier considérable offrira l’opportunité de relever avec succès le défi du changement climatique.
Mots clés: Bali; cadres de politiques; développement et climat; négociations post-2012; négociations sur le climat; protocole
de Kyoto; sud–nord
When the climate meeting in Bali came to a close at 6.27 pm
on Saturday, 15 December 2007, the longest diplomatic
battle in the history of global climate policy had finally ended,
a full day behind schedule. Not even the legendary COP-3,
which had seen the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997,
exceeded its schedule by this much. The length and
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fierceness of the negotiations bears witness to the fact
that never before had climate policy been so complex,
involving such a multitude of actors and issues. And, of
course, never before had the prospect of negotiating
concrete measures for both developed and developing
countries been on the agenda.
Also never before had the science been so unequivocal
and the public expectation been so strong. The Fourth
Assessment Report of the IPCC, adopted in 2007, provided
the strongest evidence for man-made climate change. It
also provided the strong message that decisive action
was required in order to keep the rise in global
temperatures below a threshold that would present a
chance of averting massive disturbances of the climate
system.
The stage was further set by an unprecedented number
of high-level diplomatic meetings in the same year dealing
with climate change, ranging from the G8 Summit in
Heiligendamm, Germany (6–8 June 2007) and the
Gleneagles Dialogue meeting in Berlin (10–11 September
2007) to the special sessions of the UN Security Council and
the General Assembly that involved most heads of state or
government. Shortly before the Bali Conference, the
Australian Labour Party had won the elections – with the
promise to act strongly on climate policy. Ratification of
the Kyoto Protocol was accordingly one of the first acts of
the new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd. The year 2007 can thus
be regarded as a watershed in the global endeavour to
stave off the looming danger of climate change through
multilateral cooperation.
Compared to these preconditions and expectations,
the process and the outcome of the Bali Conference appears
to be rather meagre and inadequate. But, in real-world
politics, where not only the sole remaining superpower (USA)
but also other Parties, including Canada, Japan and Russia
as well as OPEC, were doing their best to keep the
agreement as weak as possible, the success of a conference
must be measured differently. By this measure, the Bali
Conference was not only characterized by a distinctively
different atmosphere compared with the previous
conference in Nairobi 2006,1 but indeed saw a significant
shift in the battle lines; a rearrangement of positions and
alliances that might well announce a decisive new era in
global climate policy.
The most tangible result of the Bali Conference was the
agreement on the ‘Bali Action Plan’ establishing an ‘Ad-hoc
Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under
the Convention’ (AWG-Long Term) with the participation
of the USA and developing countries. The more informal
‘Dialogue’ under the Convention that was initiated at
COP-11 in Montreal in 2005 has thus been transformed
into fully fledged negotiations. It continues the two-track
approach:2 The AWG-Long Term will work in parallel
with the already existing working group on Annex I
Parties’ commitments under Article 3.9 of the Kyoto
Protocol, and with the same deadline (2009), in order to
strike a comprehensive deal by COP-15/CMP-5 in
Copenhagen.
Regarding commitments, the decision calls for
developed country Parties’ mitigation commitments
‘including quantified emission limitation and reduction
objectives’, while ‘ensuring the comparability of efforts
among them’ – a major setback to the drive of the USA
and others to replace Kyoto-style binding absolute targets
with voluntary pledges. The decision also calls for ‘nationally
appropriate mitigation actions by developing country
Parties in the context of sustainable development’. Due to
resistance by the USA, Canada, Japan and Russia, an
indicative range of mitigation commitments by industrialized
countries that is considered necessary by the IPCC to stay
below two degrees (25–40% compared to 1990 levels)
was not included in the text, but was relegated to a
reference in a footnote.
One major step forward lies in the language used,
because it moves away from the hitherto sacrosanct division
between ‘Annex I’ and ‘non-Annex I’ countries. Using
the terms ‘developed country Parties’ and ‘developing
country Parties’ instead, this decision opens the gate
for new combinations of commitments suitable for the
different stages of economic development, emissions and
mitigation potential in which developing countries find
themselves. Finding appropriate indicators and methods
for differentiation between developing countries will be one
of the huge tasks of the next two years ahead.3
The Bali Conference also saw developments in financing
and technology transfer – hitherto always treated as side
issues. This has led to widespread dissatisfaction on the
part of non-Annex I countries, which increasingly demand
more substantial offers from Annex I countries. Very
important, the Adaptation Fund was made operational, and
the Kyoto Protocol is thus finally ready to be fully
implemented – 2 weeks before the start of its first commitment
period.
The major breakthrough on technology and finance,
however, was achieved in the Bali Action Plan. According to
the decision, mitigation actions by developing country Parties
must be ‘supported and enabled by technology, financing
and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and
verifiable manner’. This in the end proved to be the ‘make or
break’ formulation in the final hours of the conference. True,
the UNFCCC already commits industrialized countries to
technology transfer and financial support of mitigation
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measures undertaken by developing countries (Articles 4.3
and 4.5). But it has become more and more obvious that
mitigation activities by developing countries on the scale
required to combat dangerous climate change will require
support from the North on an order of magnitude that is far
beyond anything that has so far been considered.
Nevertheless, the diplomatic acknowledgement had so far
been missing in the post-2012 negotiation process. Moving
the words ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’ away from
developing countries’ mitigation actions to the technological
and financial support testifies to the enhanced importance
of developing countries and the emerging economies in
climate negotiations. Developing countries thus have a clearly
worded anchor, in line with the formulations already
embodied in the UNFCCC (Articles 4.3 and 4.5), that any
commitments on their part have to be matched by clearly
identifiable and transparent support from industrialized
countries.
The Bali Action Plan, therefore, despite its rather timid
language, represents a real achievement in real-world
politics. Considering that the most powerful country has
moved from a position of climate denial a few years ago
to participation in an international dialogue on tackling
climate change is a positive step, even though the
USA, Canada and Japan had underwritten the
acknowledgement in principle of multilateral approaches
already at the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm. The creation
of US climate policy remains one of the biggest mysteries
of our time, which future historians will find difficult to
comprehend. Al Gore urged the delegates, in his address
to a packed plenary, to overlook the current obstructive
tactics and instead anticipate where the USA will be in two
years’ time, due to national elections. With these words,
Gore provided the script to a drama that unfolded in the
last frenzied hours of the conference. The US delegation
was collectively forced to budge by delegates and all other
participants and had to withdraw its reservations to the
final agreement. The tension that had built up during the
conference by the consistent obstruction was unleashed
in a collective uproar and the USA ‘got out of the way’, as
the delegate from Papua–New Guinea had demanded
earlier.
In contrast to many apprehensions before the conference,
developing countries showed an unprecedented willingness
to take up an active role in the fight against climate change.
This testifies to the mature character of these countries and
governments. Bali thus effectively annihilated the main excuse
of the present US administration for not acting on climate
change; namely that developing countries are unwilling to
make a contribution. It also points to the great potential for
cooperation with the European Union on the design of the
post-2012 agreement. The EU, for its part, spent the first
week of the conference trying to act as a bridge leading the
USA and their allies back into the fold, but in the second week
reinforced its position and strongly fought back attempts to
water down the draft decisions. While weak on substance,
Bali thus opened a vista on what shape a post-2012 deal
could take over the next two years.
The Bali Action Plan thus paves the way for the
negotiations towards a post-2012 agreement in 2009 at
Copenhagen. However, the way is not a highway but a
rather bumpy road filled with potholes and obstacles. There
is, first, the complexity and sheer workload. The delegations
will have to manage negotiations in six different arenas: the
COP and the CMP of Convention and Protocol, the two
subsidiary bodies of both treaties and the Ad-hoc Working
Groups under the Convention and the Protocol. The AWG-
Long-Term initiated by the Bali Action Plan has tentatively
scheduled four sessions, with the first session taking place
not later than April 2008. The Ad Hoc Working Group on
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto
Protocol (AWG-Article 3.9), according to its work plan
adopted in Bali, will also hold four meetings in 2008 and
2009, respectively. In addition, there will be several meetings
of the ‘major economies’ initiative by the US government
and a flurry of other formal and informal meetings on the
same issues. If the utter exhaustion of even several ‘veterans’
of the diplomatic circus during the final hours of the Bali
Conference is not to become a common sight in these
negotiations, the participants will have to find ways of
accommodating their capacities to these demands.
They will also have to find ways to deal with the enormous
work load ahead, from negotiating deepened commitments
for those countries that are already bound under the Kyoto
Protocol, new commitments for developing countries
(including methods for differentiation), integrating the USA
with new commitments, adaptation, deforestation, vastly
improved financial mechanisms, technology cooperation,  to
improving the market mechanisms that are still in the first
stages of their existence. All these processes have to be kept
under surveillance, kept apart, streamlined where necessary,
and – in the end – all those different threads have to be
combined into one gigantic package deal. Tying all the pieces
together has already proved difficult enough in Bali.
Second, the issues at hand involve decisions with far-
reaching political implications. For example, the necessary
differentiation of commitments for developing countries
implies a rethinking of the relations within the G77/China.
Differentiation is not unthinkable and has happened already
in other contexts such as the trade negotiations, where
interests are also extremely diverse among the group. But it
will require major political will and courage. The language in
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the Bali Action Plan indicates that the G77/China has realized
the challenge.
Third, the final outcome of the negotiations up to
Copenhagen will crucially depend on a single national political
process – that of the USA. Despite the breathtaking
developments at the level of dozens of states, hundreds of
cities and millions of citizens, it is at the federal level of the US
government where the most important decisions are being
taken. A new president of whatever political colour may
change the basic stance on climate policy. But close
observers of the political process in the USA are warning
that the USA after 2009 will still be a long way from where
the rest of the world is already. Getting a climate agreement
ratified by Congress may prove to be impossible for the
next president. One possible route out of this deadlock could
be substituting the ratification of the international agreement
by, first, the establishment of a strong national climate
programme in the USA, including ambitious reduction
targets, and, as a second step, a unilateral declaration that
the USA considers itself bound to these targets by
international law.4 There is a small chance that such a binding
international declaration under international law in lieu of
ratifying the international agreement could satisfy the rest of
the world. This would, however, require quite a degree of
goodwill on the part of the industrialized partners and
especially the emerging economies.
Fourth, Bali saw the emergence of the social justice
movement on climate change. The climate negotiations have
never been pure environmental diplomacy because
economic considerations have always loomed large at every
conference. Bali, however, saw many new faces in the halls
and corridors: social justice activists at the national as well
as the international level have discovered in recent years
that climate change is fundamentally altering the way they
have been working. This is true for the impacts of climate
change, which threaten to undermine social progress,
especially in the South. But it is also true of the response
measures to climate change; for example, in the search for
alternatives to fossil fuels, the demand for agrofuels is
threatening large forest areas in the Amazon and the Pacific,
affecting local ecosystems as well as subsistence economies
living on those forests. Furthermore, the sheer volume of the
financial resources required – in the range of hundreds of
billion dollars per year – will dwarf the traditional flows in
official development aid. Therefore, organizations ranging
from Oxfam to the Third World Network and Focus on the
Global South are now taking the issue of climate change
seriously. As a result of their participation, the content and
tone of the negotiations are beginning to change and their
support has led to greatly increased confidence on the part
of the larger developing countries.
This is, fifth, the biggest task at hand: forging an alliance
between North and South – with the emerging economies on
mitigation and with the poorer countries on adaptation.5 It has
become clear that the threat of destabilization of the climate
system can only be solved by a truly global effort. Around
50% of emissions at the moment stem from Annex I countries,
with the remaining 50% from non-Annex I countries, and this is
rising rapidly. Each side thus has the potential to lead the
world into climate chaos if it continues on a course of business-
as-usual – some new form of ‘mutually assured destruction’.
There is a difference, though: in the cold war, both sides had
to refrain from doing something, i.e. from pushing the button.
Averting climate change, however, requires something
positive, it demands activity and cooperation.
The Bali coalition between developing countries and the
EU that allowed for passage of the Bali Action Plan provides
some reason for optimism that it will be possible to strike an
adequate post-2012 agreement. Nevertheless, while the
emerging economies have made a first move and gave clear
signals that they are willing to bear their fair share, the EU
will have to significantly step up its efforts not only in the area
of mitigation but also with regard to technology cooperation
and finance. Substantial contributions from the South will
require equally substantial financial and non-financial support
from the North, a truth that only a few negotiators are willing to
acknowledge, at least publicly. Building a ‘green alliance’
with the South will require a significant change in attitude.
But the rewards could also be substantial – for Europe, for
South–North relations, and for the world.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Florian Mersmann and
Christof Arens for their support in Bali.
Notes
1. See Sterk, W., Ott, H.E., Watanabe, R., Wittneben, B.,
2007, ‘The Nairobi Climate Change Summit (COP 12–
MOP 2): taking a deep breath before negotiating post-
2012 targets?’ Journal for European Environmental and
Planning Law 2, 139–148.
2. See Wittneben, B., Sterk, W., Ott, H.E., Brouns, B., 2006,
‘The Montreal Climate Summit: starting the Kyoto business
and preparing for post-2012: The Kyoto Protocol’s First
Meeting of the Parties (MOP 1) and COP 11 of the
UNFCCC’, Journal for European Environmental and
Planning Law 2, 90–100.
3. See e.g. Ott, H.E., Winkler, H., Brouns, B., Kartha, S.,
Mace, M.J., Huq, S., Kameyama, Y., Sari, A.P., Pan, J.,
The Bali roadmap: new horizons for global climate policy 95
CLIMATE POLICY
Sokona, Y., Bhandari, P.M., Kassenberg, A., La Rovere,
E.L., Rahman, A., 2004, South–North Dialogue on Equity
in the Greenhouse: A Proposal for an Adequate and
Equitable Global Climate Agreement, GTZ Climate
Protection Programme, May 2004 [available at
www.wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wiprojekt1085_
proposal.pdf]; see also www.fiacc.net
4. See Ott, H.E., 2007, Climate Policy post-2012 – A
Roadmap: The Global Governance of Climate Change,
Discussion paper for the 2007 Tällberg Forum, Tällberg
Foundation, Stockholm [available at www.wupper
inst. org/uploads/tx_wibeitrag/Ott_Taellberg_Post
2012.pdf].
5. See Ott, H.E. (2007), as above, Note 4.
